The court argues that, although the CJEU has ruled that the customs authorities of the country of import are not obliged to accept certificates of origin beyond the period of validity provided for in customs regulations, they must accept such certificates if they have previously exercised their powers of control.
The tax authorities have repeatedly discussed the validity of the proofs of origin provided by taxpayers in order to enjoy tariff benefits when importing goods originating in countries to which the European Union has granted preferential tariff treatment. In particular, the application of these benefits to the release for free circulation of goods belonging to a quota has been denied, when these clearances have been carried out after the two-year period of validity of the certificates of origin covering the importation has expired, even though those same certificates have already been presented to the Spanish customs authorities and admitted by them before the expiry of that period on the occasion of clearances partial goods of goods belonging to the same quota.
In an appeal in cassation led by Garrigues, the Supreme Court decided to refer a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling so that the court could rule on various customs issues and, inter alia, requested that the validity or virtuality of the proofs of origin of goods subject to specific special regimes be specified, after the period of two years after the date of issue or establishment of those tests, when partial clearances have been made within that period.
In its judgment of 30 October 2025 (Case C-348/24), the CJEU concluded that customs authorities are not obliged to accept proof of origin once the deadlines have been exceeded, and it is up to the customs authorities of the importing country to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a particular good is eligible for preferential tariff treatment on the basis of a proof of origin submitted out of time, considering the right of those authorities to verify the actual origin of the goods.
In short, the CJEU did not exclude the possibility that the customs authorities, depending on the specific circumstances of the case and whether, in view of these, the objective of enabling the customs authorities to verify the origin of the goods is preserved, may accept the validity of the proofs of origin submitted after the end of the periods provided for in the regulations. In other words, from this judgment it could be understood that the customs authorities are not generally obliged to accept certificates submitted after the deadline, but this does not necessarily imply that they cannot do so or even that they should not do so in certain circumstances; in particular, when the customs authorities have been able to exercise their powers of verification in respect of such evidence.
This is how the Supreme Court has finally understood it.
In its judgment of 24 March 2026 (appeal 7451/2021), this court concluded that it had to analyze the specific case and, based on the CJEU’s ruling, pointed out that the fact that customs authorities are not obliged to accept certificates of origin beyond the two-year period does not mean that they cannot do so; expressly integrating the principle of legitimate expectations as a decisive criterion for resolving the specific dispute.
For the court, what is decisive is, in line with what was interpreted by the CJEU, that the powers of control and verification of the Administration are preserved. If that is the case, and in the interests of the principle of legitimate expectations, where the certificate of origin has been verified and accepted by the Administration itself in the context of partial clearances for free circulation carried out within a period of two years, the validity of those certificates must be accepted in clearances made after that period.
This judgment constitutes a significant milestone in the consolidation of the principle of legitimate expectations in the customs field, limiting the rigidity of administrative practices that ignore fully valid prior actions of the Administration itself. By recognizing that the prior admission of certificates of origin, after the effective exercise of the powers of verification, prevents their subsequent rejection for purely formal reasons, the Supreme Court reinforces the legal certainty of economic operators and requires a coherent, predictable administrative action that respects the principle of good administration.
Beyond its undoubted impact on proving the origin of goods, the scope of this doctrine transcends the strictly customs field and projects its effects on tax practice in general, offering a particularly relevant criterion for the defense of taxpayers against changes in criteria or contradictory actions by the Administration.
